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SUPREIE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS. 2
SUPRE'ME COURT OF IOWA.
3
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND. 4
SUPRE1E COURT OF TENNESSEE.5
ACTION
ILsurance--Party to whom Loss Payable-Right to Sute in own iName.
-An insurance policy issued to Coates & Bro. contained the clause,
"loss, if any, payable to the Savings Bank of Baltimore, mortgagee."
Held, that C. & Bro , with the express written consent of the Savings
Bank of Baltimore, could, in ease of loss, bring an action on the policy,
in their own names: Coates v. The Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 58 Md.
AD MIRALTY.
Jurisdiction-Tort-Injury to Consignee boarding Vessel at Wharf-
Negllgent Stowage.-The jurisdiction of courts of admiralty extends to
a suit against the owners of a vessel by one who, expecting a consign-
ment of goods by the vessel, and in accordance with a general custom,
went aboard of her upon her arrival at the wharf, and, while proceeding
to the office, was injured by the fall of bales negligently stowed: Leath-
e's v. Blessing, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
Act of Feb. 16th 1875-Constitutionality of-Limitation of Appeal
to Question of Law-Refusal to find certain Facts-Bill of Exceptions.
-The Act of Congress of Feb 16th 1875, confining the appellate juris-
diction of the Supeeme Court in admiralty to questions of law arising
on the record, is constitutional : Duncan v. Steamship Francis Wright,
S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
If- the court below refuses to make a finding as to a material fact, or
finds a fact which is not supported by any evidence whatever, the ruling
may be brought up for review by bill of exceptions, but this rule does
not apply to mere incidental facts which only amount to evidence bear-
ing upon the ultimate facts of the case : Id.
Where the ground of the appeal is the refusal to find a certain fact,
it should appear that appellants called the attention of the court to the
fact as a 'material one in the cause and to the testimony which conclu-
sively proved it, and such testimony should be contained in the bill of
exceptions. And so if the exception is as to facts that are found, it
should be stated that it was because there was no evidence to sustain
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term 1881. The cases will probably appear in 15 Otto.
2 From B. D. Turner, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 38 Arkansas Reports.
3 From Hon. John S. Runnells, Reporter ; to appear in 57 Iowa Reports.
4 From J. Shaaff Stoekett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 58 Maryland Reports.
6 From Hon. Benjamin J. Lea, Reporter. The cases will probably appear in 8 oz
9 Lea.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
them, and then so much of the testimony as is necessary to estaolish
this ground of complaint should be incorporated in the bill of excep-
tions : Id.
AGENT. See Bills and Notes.
BANKRUPTCY. See Debtor anq Creditor.
BILL OP ExCEPTIONS. See Admiralty.
Statement of Charge.-The bill of exceptions should not set forth tle
charge of the court in full. Only such parts should be gien as will
point the exceptions ; all else is unnecessary and produces only inconve-
nience. The judges of the court below should withhold their signa-
tures to the bill until it is freed from all matter not essential to explain
and point the exceptions: United States v. Rindskopf, S. 0. U. S., Oct.
Term 1881.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Signing-F'aud-Negligence-Ag~nt.-'What constitutes reasonable
care and diligence in the execution of an instrument is ordinarily a
question of fact for the jury. Where a party trusts to the agent of the
payee to read a note correctly, without calling upon a member of his
family to read it for him before signing, it is not, as a matter of law,
negligence : Hopkins v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 57 Iowa.
The fraudulent acts of an agent, committed in the direct line of his
employment, will render the principal liable : Id.
It is competent to show by parol, that because of the fraud of a party
to an instrument, it does not express the real agreement: Id.
Want of Consideration-Evidence.-As between the immediate par-
ties to a negotiable romissory note, while the note itself is prima facie
evidence of the consideration, the question of consideration is always
open; and it is competent to the defendant to show, by parol, that there
was no sufficient consideration, or that the consideration had failed, or
that the paper had been given for accommodation merely: Ingersoll v.
.Martin, 58 Md. !-
CHARITY.
Uncertain designation of Beneficiaries-Next of Kin.-The residuary
clause of a will, provided as follows: " Whatever balance, if any, shall
remain after payment of my debts and all necessary expenses, I direct
my executor to divide proportionally between benevolent associations of
this city, for the benefit of white and colored children." On a bill filed
by the executor to obtain a judicial construction of said clause, it was
held : 1st. That said clause was void; first, because the lenevolent asso-
ciations to which the testator referred, were not named or designated in
the will ; and second, because the beneficiaries for whose use the gift
was intended, were undefined and uncertain. 2d. That the next of kin
of the testator were entitled to the fund : The .Henr9y Watson Children's
.Aid Society'v. Johnston, 58 T1d.
COMMON CARRIER.
Railroad-Liability for Baggage- Check to Point beyond its own
.i'ne.-A carrier contracting, without any limitation of responsibility, to
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carry the baggage of a passenger, and giving a check therefor, to a given
point beyond the terminus of the carrier's line, becomes liable for the
carriage of such baggage to the point to which it is checked, notwith-
standing that its owner may purchase and travel upon a coupon ticket:
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Weaver, 8 or 9 Lea.
Plaintiff bought tickets from the defendant railroad for transportation
for herself and family from 'Memphis to San Francisco, each ticket hav-
ing separate- coupons for each carrier over whose road the route lay.
Defendant gave plaintiff a check for the carriage of her baggage to
Omaha, a point beyond its own line. The baggage was lost before reach-
ing Omaha, but after leaving defendant's line. Held, that defendant
was liable for the loss : Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Admiralty.
CONTRACT.
Gonsideration-Release- Subsequent Promise.-If a debtor by paying
part of his admitted debt, obtains from his creditor an agreement to
release the residue, such an agreement is nudum. pactum, and therefore
inoperative. But a release under seal imports consideratidn, and such
a release is a sufficient discharge without anything more: Ingersoll v.
Martin, 58 Md.
A promise to pay a debt, after it has been voluntarily released by the
creditor, is not supported by a sufficient legal consideration to make it
binding: Id.
Charge for use of Railroad- Use of Road while refusing to pay Pice
-Quatura Valebant.-A., who was the proprietor of a railroad, in-
formed B., who had been previously using it, that for all cars subse-
quently shipped over it, he wduld charge $2 each; B. immediately
replied that he would not pay that amount, and continued to use the road.
Upon bill filed by A., seeking to collect from B. $2 for each car, ir was
held, that he could only recover the reasonable value of the use of the
road: Curtis v. Giers, 8 or 9 Lea..
CORPORATION.
Assets a Trust Fund for Creditors-Purchase by Director.-The assets
of an incorporated company are a trust fund for the payment of its
debts, and may be followed into the hands of any person acquiring them
with notice of the trust. A director of the company is conclusively
presumed to know its pecuniary condition, and his purchase of the assets
will not be bona fide, and without notice of the trust : Jones v. Ark.
Mech. and Agl. Co., 38 Ark.
The purchase of the assets of an incorporated company by a direc-
tor of the company, is not void, but only voidable at the instance of a
party in interest : Id.
COST. See Trustee.
DAMAGES. See Equity.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Partnership.
Fraudulent Conveyances, when imP eachable by Subsequent Creditors.
-A voluntary conveyance may be impeached by a subsequent creditor
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on the ground that it was made in fraud of existing creditors; but. to
do so, he must show either that actual fraud was intended, or that there
were debts still unpaid which the grantor owed at the time of making
it: Toney v. McGehee, 38 Ark.
Fraud will not be inferred from an act which does not necessarily
import it. It is never presumed, and circumstances of mere suspicion,
leading to no certain results, are not sufficient proof of it: Id.
Fraudulent Convezance-ntent'to avoid Claim for Tort.-To render
a conveyance invalid, as between a fraudulent grantor and his grantee,
it is not necessary that the fraudulent intent, or knowledge, should be
traced to the grantee: Weir v. Day. 57 Iowa.
A person having a claim for a tort is a creditor, and where the con-
veyance was made with the intent in part to evade fines and judgments
which might be obtained for torts, it renders the conveyance wholly
fraudulent: d.
.Mortgage to Creditor to Defraud other £'edtors.-A mortgage
executed by an insolvent mortgagor and covering his entire estate, to a
creditor who knows of his insolvency and who for the purpose of giving
him a fictitious credit, conceals the mortgage and withholds it from the
record and represents the mortgagor as having a large estate and
unlimited credit, by which means the latter is enabled to contract other
debts which he cannot pay. is void at common law: Blennerhasset v.
Sherman, S. 0. U. S, Oct. Term 1881.
Such mortgage is void under the Bankrupt Act a'ithough executed
more than two months before the filing of the petition : Id.
DECEDENTS' ESTATES.
Insolvent Estate-Liability of Land-nprovements by Heirs.-An
executrix, who was authorized by the will to convey portions of the
realty to the female heirs upon their marriage, conveyed a lot to
N., whose husband, believing the estate solvent, erected valuable im-
provements thereon; the estate subsequently became insolvent. Held,
that the husband, upon paying what would be the present value of the
lot without the improvements, could hold the lot: Gillespie v. -Murphy,
8 or 9 Lea.
DEED.
Consideration-Suport of Parents-Failure of.-A conveyance made
upon the consideration of support of parents will be set aside when
the evidence shows an abandonment by all 'the parties, of the contract
of support: Jewell v. Reddington, 57 Iowa.
DESCENT.
illegitimate Children-- Transmission of Inheritance- Change of Laws
of Descent.-Ohildren of the same mother, whether legitimate or ille-
gitimate, may transmit an inheritance to any and all collateral rela-
tions on the mother's side who are of her blood : Gregley v. Jackson,
38 Ark.
Laws of. inheritance rest in public policy; and during the life of the
person owning the property, may be changed at will, without any viola-
tion of contractual or vested rights. No one has a vested right to be
the future heir of one living : Id.
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DURESS.
Deed by J Married Woman-Evidence.-To set aside a deed made by
a married woman, on the ground of duress or undue influence, where
it appears from the proof that she was a lady of good intelligence and
capacity, in full possession of her mental faculties, and the deed shows
upon its face that she appeared with her husband before a justice of the
peace, and solemnly acknowledged it to be her act, requires the clearest
and most satisfactory evidence: Littnenkerper v. Kempton, 58 Md.
EQUITY. See Husband and Wife.
Iju nction- Taking of Bond-Jurisdiction of Court over Question, of
Damages-Unted States Courts-Appeal.-Where in an equity cause
an injunction has been granted and an injunction bond required, the
court has, on the final disposition of the oause, power to make a decree
granting or denying damages on account of such injunction : Russell v.
Farley, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
Such power is an inherent one not depending on any provision in the
bond, nor on express law or rule of court, and it may be exercised by a
circuit court of the United States into which the'suit had been removed,
although the state court from which it was removed could not, under
the state statutes, have determined the question of damage: Id.
Semble. The court may also assess the amount of the damages
without requiring an action of law upon the 
bond : 1.
The decision of the court on the question of damages approaches so
near to an exercise of discretion that it would require a very clear case
to induce the appellate court to reverse : Id.
Cause Cognisable at Law-Failure of Ground of Equitable Relief-
Where a cause of action cognisable at law is entertained in equity on
the ground of some equitable relief sought by the bill, which it turns
out cannot, for defect of proof or other reason, be granted, the court
is without jurisdiction to proceed further, and should dismiss the bill
and remit the cause to a court of law : .itclell v. Dowell, S. (. U. S.,
Oct. Term 1881.
ERRORS AND APPEALS. See Bill of Exceptions.
EVIDENCE. See Bills and Notes.
EXECUTION.
Levy-How JMade.-To make a legal, valid levy upon personal pro.
perty, the officer must do such acts as that, but for the protection of the
writ, he would be liable in trespass. A levy under which the officer
does not have actual control of the personal property levied upon, with
power of removal, is invalid: Rix v. Silknitter, 57 Iowa.
EXECUTORS AND ADM3IINISTRATORS.
Power of Sale-Does not Include Power to Mortgage-Renewal of
Decedents' -Zotes-Personal Liability of Executri-Subrogation.-
An executrix has no authority, unless it is expressly or impliedly con-
ferred by the will, to mortgage real assets of the estate for money bor-
rowed by her for the purpose of paying debts of the estate ; and the
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fact tlat sne is authorized by the will to sell realty for reinvestment
or distribution, will not impliedly empower her to borrow money and
mortg'ge realty therefor : Gillespie v. Murpijl, 8 or 9 Lea.
An executrix cannot borrow money and charge her estate for its
repayment, and persons lending her money for use. in payment of the
debts of the estate, do not thereby become creditors of the estate but
personal creditors of the executrix, who may limit her personal lia-
bility by agreeing to pay only out of the assets of her testator, but.
she cannot thereby charge her estate : Id.
An executrix renewing notes of her testator makes them her personal
obligations, even though she expressly contracts as executrix : Id.
Persons lending money to an executrix, paye.es of notes renewed by
an executrix, and mortgagees for sums loaned the executrix, cannot
prove as creditors of the estate under an administration bill ; but the
executrix may prove as creditor to the extent that sums so borrowed
by her have been used in satisfying valid charges against the estate,
and such creditors may by cross-bill be substituted to her rights, and
thus become general creditors of the estate : Id.
EXPRESS OOMPANY.
Privilege Tax-Railroad doing Express Business.-A foreign rail-
road company having an office within a state, and which carries on as
part of its business a regular " express business," is liable to pay a
privilege tax which is by statute required to be paid by "all express
companies doing business in the state :" XMemphis & Little RocZk Rail-
road v. State, 8 or 9 Lea.
FRAUD.
lisrepresentation-Expression of Opinion.-Whenever property of
any kind depends for its value upon contingencies which may nei'er
occur or developments which may never be made, opinion as to its
value must necessarily be more or less of a speculative character, and
no action will lie for its expression, however fallacious it may prove, or
whatever the injury a reliance on it may produce : Gordon v. Butler,
S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1881.
Semble. For opinions upon matters capable of accurate estimation by
application of mathematical rules or scientific principles, such, for
example, as the capacity of boilers or the strength of materials, the
case may be different. So, also, for opin;i)ns of parties possessing
special learning or knowledge upon the subjects in respect to which
their opinions are given, as of a mechanic upon the working of a
machine he has seen in use, or of a lawyer upon the title of property
which he has examined. Opinions upon such matters are capable of
approximating to the truth, and for a false statement of them where
deception is designed and injury follows, an action may lie: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Alimony-Eow Enforced-Jurisdiction of Chancery-Courts of
chancery have jurisdiction to order the husband to pa) ad interim ali-
mony to his wife to enable her to prosecute her suit for divorce, and to
enforce it by all or any of the means by which courts usually compel
obedience-whether by execution or other orders, or by proceedings as
for contempt; and if he be the plaintiff, and his wife's answer a cross-
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complaint, his complaint may be dismissed for disobedience to the
order, and the cross-complaint prosecuted to final decree. An appeal
from an order for ad interim alimony may be taken immediately : Cas-
teel v. Casteel, 38 Ark.
Alimony should not be declared a lien upon the husband's lands.
Its payment may be secured by sequestration or by exacting securities
from him : Id.
INJUNCTION. See Egiuity.
INSURANCE. See Action.
JUDICIAL SALE.
Covenants of Warranty-Right of Purchaser to Benefit of-A cove-
nant of warranty runs with the land and enures to the benefit of a pur-
chaser at a judicial sale. One who buys the land at a sale in a vendor's
suit, to enforce his lien, may sue the vendor for a subsequent eviction,
which constitutes a breach of vendor's warranty to his vendee:
Williars v. Berg, 8 or 9 Lea.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Right to Crop as against Afortgagee.-Wben a tenant abandons his
crop and fails to perform the terms of his lease, the landlord may gather,
gin and bale the cotton cultivated by him, and take out of it and retain
against the tenant's mortgagee of the crop the expenses of preserving
it from waste and preparine it for market, as well as the rent : Fry v
Ford, 38 Ark.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE or.
Fraudulent Conveyance-Right of Creditor-Joint Friendly Pos-
session.-The Statute of. Limitations in favor of a fraudulent or volun-
tary grantee begins to run against the creditor of the grantor who seeks
to enforce his debt against, the property conveyed, from the time when
such creditor has a right of action to test the validity-of such convey-
ance: Ramsey v. Quillen, 8 or 9 Lea.
Adverse possession for the statutory period after the creditor's claim
matured, first by a son to whom the debtor had conveyed, then by the
wife of the debtor to whom the son conveyed, and then by another
son to whom the wife had conveyed, is sufficient to bar the creditor's
right : Id.
In cases of joint friendly occupation of land the benefit of such pos-
session enures to him who has the legal title : Id.
Occupation by husband and wife, where the legal title has been con-
veyed to the wife and registered, and possession is held openly under
such deed, enures to the benefit of' the wife. She cannot be deprived
of the benefit of the Statute of Limitations by such joint possession, nor
is she required to live apart from her husband in order to hold her
land : Id.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Contract for Particular Time- Wihen entire-Action for Part Per-
formance.-When a contract for service is for a particular time, and pay-
ment is to be made, either expressly or by implication of law, at the end of
the period, and the servant leaves the service of his master improperly,
Vor,. X .- 95
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without a sufficient cause, and without his consent, before the expira-
tion of that time, he can recover no compensation for his services,
either on the contract or on a quantum meruit: .Hibbard v. Kirty, 38
Ark.
MORTGAGE. See Landlord and Tenant ; Surety.
After acquired Title-Judgment Liens.-A mortgage of lands not
owned by the mortgagor, will attach and become a lien thereon, there
being no intervening equities, the moment the mortgagor acquires title
to the land, and it cannot be divested by, or rendered subordinate to,
the lien of subsequent judgments: Rice v. Kelso, 57 Iowa.
Holders of judgment liens, not made parties in the foreclosure of a
superior mortgage, have their right of redemption, but cannot acquire
titles under execution sales that will defeat the mortgage title : Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Negligence.
NEGLIGENCE. See Railroad.
JlIunici paZ Corporation-Diversion of Stream- Contributory Negli-
gence.-In an action against a city to recover for an injury to a building,
alleged to have been caused by the wrongful and negligent obstruction
of the natural channel, and diversion of the course of a stream by the
defendant, the failure of plaintiff to use ordinary diligence and effort to
prevent damage, and to incur moderate expense, if thereby the injury
might have been prevented, would constitute contributory negligence,
and entirely bar recovery; and an instruction that in such case he would
still be entitled to recover such sum as would have prevented the injury
if it had been expended, was erroneous: Hoehl v. City of fuscatine,
57 Iowa.
Where a stream meanders through a city, and lots and streets have
been platted without reference to it, nor bounded by it, the doctrine of
riparian proprietorship is not applicable : fd.
Railroad-Burden of .Proof.-An action in the name of the state
was brought against a railroad company to recover damages for a.death
alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant. The
deceased was found under the cars of the defendant mortally wounded.
There was no testimony showing in what manner he got under the cars.
Whether he was attempting to get on them while in motion, or fell while
attempting to cross the track, was not explained by the evidence. The
cars were on a siding, and going at the raite of one mile an hour. Held,
1. That the jury were properly instructed that : under the pleadings
and evidence in the cause the plaintiff was not entitled to recover." .2.
That the burden was upon the plaintiff in the first instance to prove
negligence or want of ordinary care on the part of defendant's agents
causing the accident: State, to use of .Miller, v. The Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Co., 58 Md.
The place where the 4ceident'happened was not at a street, or high-
way, or a crossing-place. The defendant was entitled to a clear unob-
structed track, and could not presume that any one would intrude
thereon. There was no evidence that the deceased had any right to go
upon thie track. Held, that even'assuming that there was soie evidence
that the cars had no brakeman on them while being run upon the sid-
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ing, that fact would be no ground for charging the defendant with cul-
pable negligence: Id.
PARTNERSHIP.
Voluntary Conveyance-Constructive Fraud-Subseguent Creditors.-
Where a member of a partilership, which was largely indebted, made a
voluntary conveyance of all his individual property, but without any
purpose to defraud the firm creditors, such conveyance would be con-
structively fraudulent, and liable to be avoided: Barhydt v. Perry, 57
Iowa.
Where the conveyance was voluntary, and included all of the indi-
vidual property of one member of a partnership, which was largely
indebted at the time, subsequent creditors whose means have been used
to pay off the prior indebtedness will be subrogated to the rights of the
prior creditors, and they may avoid such conveyance : Id.
Unauthorized Suit byi one Partner-Ratification by Silence-Ignor-
ance of the Law.-Where a suit is brought in the name of a firm by
one partner, without the knowledge or consent of his copartners, and
the latter upon learning of it express their disapproval, but take no
steps to have it dismissed, and wait until a decree entered by the lower
court in their favor is reversed on error and a decree entered against
them, they cannot escape responsibility or claim relief against the exe-
cution of the final decree: Harris v. Jfosby,Receive., 8 or 9 Lea.
In such case it makes no difference that their acquiescence was in,
ignorance of the law, and in consequence of the advice of counsel that
they were legally bound by the institution of the suit: Id.
RAILROAD. See Express Company.
.Negligence-Rate of Speed.-In an action against a railroad company
for the killing of plaintiff's mules by a train, the court charged that if
at the rate of speed the train was running it could not have been stopped
within the distance at which the headlight upon the locomotive would
discover obstructions upon the track, and the jury should be of the
opinion from these facts that defendants were reckless in so running
the train, the defendants were liable notwithstanding all the prescribed
precautions were observed. Held, that this was error, as the fact that
the train could not be stopped within the distance mentioned was not the
true test of negligence, although it might be evidence to be considered
with all the other circumstances : i'Uilam v. L. & IV. Railroad Co., 8
or 9 Lea.
SALE.
Warranty-Patent Defects-Fraud.-Neithei warranties nor false
representations bind the maker, regarding things patent to any observer
who would take the trouble to examine the article, where the aggrieved
party has the opportunity of seeing it. But where one of the parties
declines the examination on the grounds of his want of experience and
judgment, and expressly declares that he confides in the judgment of
the other, this imposes upon the other, if he accepts the trust, the duty
of fair representations, even as to matters which might easily have been
seen by one well acquainted with the subject of the negotiation; but
even then he is bound only for a fair exercise of his judgment, and is not
liable for an henest mistake: Hanger 
v. Evins, 88 Ark.
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If a vendor, experienced in the manufacture and use of an article,
knows that the purchaser is without experience in such things, and that
there are material defects in it, which are not apparent to ordinary ob-
servation, and he deceitfully induces the purchaser not to inquire into
its condition, he is guilty of a fraud, for which the purchaser may re-
cover: Id.
- If a vendor knows the purposes for which an article is intended by
the purchaser, and so represents to him, and also knowingly and fraud-
,ulently represents that he knows the purchaser's business, and that the
article is well fitted for it, and the purchaser rely on such representations
in making the purchase, and they are untrue, it is a fraud, for which he
way recover: Id.
Warranty-Particular Furpose.-Where a known, described and de-
fined article is ordered, even of a manufacturer, although it is stated to
be required by the purchaser fbr a particular purpose, still if the known.
described and defined thing be actually supplied, there is no implied
warranty that it shall answer the particular purpose intended by the
buyer. In such case the buyer takes upon himself the risk of its effect-
ing its purpose : Rasin v. Conley, 5S Md.
This doctrine applies to sales of fertilizers by those who manufacture
them: Id.
SPECIFIC PERFORZ1ANCE.
Decree for Part only- Compensation for Residue-easure of.-
Where a vendor cannot, convey all the lands he has contracted to, the
vendee may have specific performance for the part he can convey, and
as an incident to the suit, compensation for the residue ; but courts of
equity will not assume jurisdiction for the sole purpose of awarding
damages for a breach of contract to convey, where the vendee knows at
the institution of the suit that the vendor cannot convey : Bonner v.
Little, 38 Ark.
Where a vendee of land by title-bond elects to take under the con-
tract the part which the vendor can convey, and compensation for the
residue, the price should be abated in the same proportion to the
whole amount, as the value of the whole tract is diminished by the defi-
ciency: Id.
SUBROGATION. See Executors; Partnership.
SURETY.
Joint Note- Verbal Release of one Maker-Afortyayes-Application
of Proceeds.-INWhere two persons gave their joint note for borrowed
money, of which, by an agreement known to the lender, each was to
have one-half, it was not a case of suretyship, but each was a principal
for the whole amount; and a verbal agreement of the lender upon pay-
ment of one-half by one maker to look to the other for the balance due
on the note, not shown to have been based upon a consideration, was
not binding: ,Small v. Older, 57 Iowa.
Where the proceeds of mortgages executed to secure an individual
note and a joint note were not sufficient to pay both, the holder of the
notes was under no obligation to apply the sum realized upon both notes,
pro rata, but might apply the entire sum upon the individual note : rd.
TAXATION. See Express Company.
